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INTRODUCTION

Fraud, hacking, child pornography, and illegal gambling are but a
few of the crimes that are just a mouse-click away from a
knowledgeable computer user.' The fact that millions of people use
the Internet today' provides ample opportunity for similar civil
wrongs, including defamation. Companies increasingly are becoming
1. The Internet is an international network of computers providing its users with a
plethora of communication methods. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849-52 (1997). These
communication forums are collectively known as "cyberspace"-an accessible medium
without a geographical location. Id. at 851. For a background discussion of the Internet
and its unique potential as a communication environment, see id. at 849-53. For an
excellent discussion on Internet crimes in general, see generally Laura J. Nicholson et al.,
Computer Crimes, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 207 (2000) (tracking developments in computerrelated criminal law and legal literature) and infra note 18 and accompanying text.
2. Infra note 20 and accompanying text.
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the victims of online defamation.
Such online defamation is
potentially devastating as companies' reputations are often linked to
the prices of their stock.4 The problem is so acute, in fact, that at least
one corporation has emerged to provide a 'watchdog' service,
scouring the Internet for negative comments that defame its
corporate clients.5 Finding these defamatory statements, however, is
just the beginning of a long, uphill battle for injured companies.
Since Congress has taken away any opportunity to hold the
online publishers liable for the defamatory statements of their users,6
a company's only recourse is to directly sue the writers of the
material. Many computer users operate under pseudonyms, however,
masking their true identities.7 This cloak of anonymity-part of the
First Amendment's right to free speech'-combined with a lack of
standards for these online cases, make seeking relief for defamation
in cyberspace unnecessarily difficult.
This Comment explores the many difficulties a company
confronts in pursuing an Internet defamation suit, particularly
overcoming a motion to quash a subpoena when the identity of the
author is unknown. Part I discusses the tort of defamation both in a
general context and then as it uniquely applies to Internet discourse.
Part II addresses the potential problems of suing unknown
defendants, including a discussion of the ineptness of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure in dealing with "John Doe" defendants.
Part III surveys courts' attempts to create a standard for handling
Internet defamation lawsuits and the inconsistent results in Internet
defamation cases. Finally, Part IV explores one possible solution to
the lack of standards in these cases by comparing subpoenas in
Internet defamation cases to civil lawsuits involving reporters or
journalists. The competing interests that arise in seeking a reporter's
disclosure of sources are very similar to those arising in Internet
3. See Tom Collins, As CyberSlander Suits Grow, Free Speech Threatened, FULTON
COUNTY DAILY REP., July 2, 2001, at 1.
4. One commentator has called "the potential impact a cybersmear campaign can
have on a corporation's reputation or its stock prices," devastating. Nicole B. Casarez,
Dealing with Cybersmear: How to Protect your Organizationfrom Online Defamation, 47
PUB. REL. Q. 40,40 (2002).
5. Cyveillance is a Virginia-based company and one of its services is to search the
Internet for its corporate customers, looking for slanderous writings. Collins, supra note 3.
6. Infra notes 49-55 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
8. The Supreme Court has held that the right to speak anonymously has been an
important part of speech throughout history and is protected by the First Amendment.
Buckley v. Am. Constitutional Law Found., 525 U.S. 182, 199 (1999); McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm., 514 U.S. 334, 341 (1995); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64-65 (1960).
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defamation cases, and thus the courts' standards in these cases could
provide some much needed guidance.
I. THE TORT OF DEFAMATION

A.

Defamation Traditionally

Although the First Amendment protects the right to free speech,
some speech is of such little value to society that the First
Amendment offers it no protection.'
The Supreme Court has
identified one such exception in the tort of defamation ° A word or
statement is defamatory" if it tends to harm the reputation of another
person or entity. 2 In a legal action for defamation, whether a
statement is capable of being defamatory is a question of law, 3
whereas whether the statement is both false and understood as
defamatory by its audience are questions of fact.' 4 In reaching the
factual determinations, the fact-finder examines the allegedly
defamatory statement in the total context in which it appeared and in
light of the surrounding circumstances. 5
A defendant has available two possible defenses to a claim of
defamation: (1) that the defendant is a public figure; or (2) that the
defendant's statement was merely her opinion. 6 If the defendant
successfully pleads one of these defenses, the plaintiff must satisfy a
more rigorous standard-i.e., the plaintiff must demonstrate "actual
9. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942) ("[I]t is well understood
that the right of free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circumstances.").
10. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-72 (1964); Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974). Defamation can occur by either written or oral
communication. If the statements are written it is called libel, while defamatory oral
statements are called slander. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 927 (7th ed. 1999) (defining

libel as "[a] defamatory statement expressed in a fixed medium, esp. writing"). This
Comment explores only libelous statements, but will use the general phrase "defamation"
to describe this tort.
11. There is no list of defamatory words; each case is a unique question of facts. Babb
v. Minder, 806 F.2d 749, 758 (7th Cir. 1986) (citing Korbar v. Hite, 43 Il. App. 3d 636, 639
(1976) ("There is no general rule defining what words are defamatory and, therefore, each
case depends upon its own facts.").
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) ("A communication is
defamatory if it tends so to harm the reputation of another as to lower him in the
estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with
him."). Defamation is a state law tort, so the definition varies between jurisdictions.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 256.
13. Dilworth v. Dudley, 75 F.3d 307, 309 (7th Cir. 1996).
14. Baker v. Warner, 231 U.S. 588, 594 (1913).
15. Cox Enter., Inc. v. Bakin, 426 S.E.2d 651, 653-54 (Ga. App. 1992).
16. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 282-83 (creating the then-controversial "public official"
exception to defamation).
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malice" on the part of the defendant." Though some commentators
argue that Internet discourse should fit into one of these two
exceptions, 8 thereby warranting the heightened burden, these
commentators fail to appreciate, as this Comment will clarify, the
unique concerns that pursuing a claim of Internet defamation
presents.
B.

Defamation on the Internet

Defamation on the Internet provides an original twist to some of
the existing issues of defamation law. Defamation on the Internet is
unique for several reasons: (1) as a publication medium, the Internet
is unique; (2) the consequences of defamation actions resulting from
online communications can be different; and (3) determining the
proper defendant often will be difficult.
1. The Internet as a Publication Medium
Though one may argue that the Internet should not be treated as
a Separate medium in the eyes of the law, there are many reasons
that, as a vehicle of speech, the Internet stands alone. First, the
Internet, as an unparalleled store of information, is a unique
publication medium, comprised of billions of publicly available pages
canvassing the spectrum of various information. 9 One reputable
surveyor estimates that over five hundred million people worldwide
are Internet users.2 0

17. In N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, the Court held that for a public figure to prevail in a

defamation action, he must prove the defendant acted with actual malice, thus increasing
the standard from negligence. Id. at 280.
18. See Lyrissa Barnett Lidsky, Silencing John Doe: Defamation and Disclosure in
Cyberspace, 49 DUKE L.J. 855, 865 (2000) (arguing that these cases should fall into the
opinion exception); Jeremy Stone Weber, Note, Defining Cyberlibel: A FirstAmendment
Limit for Libel Suits Against Individuals Arisingfrom Computer Bulletin Board Speech, 46

CASE W. RES. L. REv. 235, 277 (1995) (arguing that the subjects of Internet discussion
should be considered public figures). One California judge agreed, holding that the
defendants in an Internet libel case were not liable because they were stating their
opinion, and therefore, the audience could not consider this libel. Global Telemedia Int'l
v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1270 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
19. Press Release, Cyveillance, Internet Exceeds 2 Billion Pages (July 10, 2000), at

http://www.cyveillance.com/web/us/newsroom/releases/2000/2000-07-10.htm (on file with
the North Carolina Law Review) (stating the current size of the Internet in web pages and
predicting that at the current, booming rate of expansion, as of early 2001 the size of the
Internet should be doubled-to four billion pages).
20. NEILSON NET RATINGS, How MANY ONLINE? (Aug. 2001), at http://www.nua.ie/

surveys/how many-online/index.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
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In addition to its enormity, the Internet provides a limitless array
of opportunities to its users.21 The Internet, through various chat
rooms and bulletin boards, provides users with the prospect of
discussion on virtually every possible subject. Nearly every publicly
traded corporation, for example, has at least one Web site dedicated
to covering the corporation's activities and permitting ordinary users
to publicly express their opinions or concerns regarding the
corporation. 2
As one commentator explained, "[the Internet]
empowers ordinary individuals with limited financial resources to
'publish' their views on matters of public concern. '23 Not only do
these forums have a potential audience of millions, but Internet
posters are further inspired to speak freely because they are able to
do so anonymously. 24 David Sobel, an attorney for the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, asserts that communicating anonymously
is one of the Internet's greatest appeals.25 Yet this attraction may
come at a high price, as users, hidden behind a cloak of anonymity,
speak without fear of the consequences.26
Another interesting characteristic of the Internet as a public
discussion forum is the questionable reliability of its content. Though
some commentators argue that visitors to web bulletin boards realize

21. The Supreme Court explained this opportunity, stating that with the Internet,
"any person with a phone line can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther
than it could from any soapbox." Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997).
22. These sites, which may be run by the company, its investors, or outsiders, range in
subject from stock prices and potential profits to rumors of infidelity by the corporate
officers. The postings contain "information, misinformation, rumor, speculation and
strongly stated opinions" on the companies, and while these conversations used to occur
around a water cooler, today they are heard by thousands, if not millions, of listeners.
DONNA DEMAC, CYBERSMEARS AND CONSUMER REVENGE DOT COM:

CORPORATE

THREATS TO ONLINE FREE SPEECH (National Coalition Against Censorship, Aug. 2000),
at http://www.ncac.org/issues/cybersmears.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review).
23. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 860 (discussing how the Internet gives a powerful voice
to the ordinary user).
24. See Noah Levine, Note, Establishing Legal Accountability for Anonymous
Communication in Cyberspace, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1530 (1996) (discussing the
benefits of open discourse in cyberspace on topics such as sexual abuse or unpopular
political ideas that may not be discussed if it were not for pseudonyms).
25. Rebecca Fairly Raney, Judge Rejects Online Critic's Efforts to Remain
Anonymous, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 1999, at http://www.nytimes.com/library/tech99/06/
cyber/articles/15identity.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). See generally
David Sobel, The Process that "John Doe" is Due: Addressing the Legal Challenge to
Internet Anonymity, 5 VA. J.L. & TECH. 3 (2000) (discussing Internet anonymity).
26. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 863 (explaining that Internet users have a heightened
sense of "anything goes" because of the use of pseudonyms).
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that most of what they read is unsubstantiated gossip," others suggest

that people do believe what they read online, perhaps relying on this
information in making their own personal financial decisions.28
Regardless of this debate, that the Internet is a powerful means for
disseminating news and opinion-one that has a significant potential

to harm the reputation of corporations subject to this online
criticism-is undisputed.29 On the other hand, the Internet, and more
specifically Internet message boards, offer allegedly defamed entities
a unique opportunity to combat the defamatory comments by
instantly replying to defend themselves or their reputations at no
cost.3 °

2. The Consequences of Online Defamation
The potential consequences of Internet defamation further
distinguish this subset of defamation cases. In analyzing this
distinctive characteristic of Internet defamation cases, courts and
commentators should first consider the motive or goal of a
corporation that files the suit and then assess the potential "chilling
effect" that such suits could have on free speech, particularly on
Internet discourse.
Defamation suits involve three types of damages: (1) special
damages for "the loss of something having economic or pecuniary
value;"31 (2) presumed damages-a common law term allowing for
compensation for harm of unquantifiable amounts; and (3) punitive
27. Joshua R. Furman, Cybersmear or Cyber-SLAPP: Analyzing Defamation Suits
Against Online John Does as Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,25 SEATTLE
U.L. REV. 213, 217 (2001) (alleging that most users know to take what they read online
"with a grain of salt" because its validity cannot be verified and declaring there is a
growing understanding that the Web bulletins are of questionable factual value).
28. Bob Cook, Down and Dirty: Phycor and Other Companies Sue Anonymous
Message Posters for Internet Mudslinging, MODERN PHYSICIAN, June 1, 1999, at 30
(stating that although these message boards were originally "laughed off," companies are
now taking them much more seriously as they are being confronted about the online
rumors by employees and investors; furthermore, day traders are using the information
available on web bulletins to make stock decisions).
29. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 863 (describing Internet communication as "a medium
more pervasive than print," with tremendous power to injure reputations).
30. Memorandum In Support of Motion of J. Doe to Quash Subpoena Issued to
Silicon Investor/Infospace, Inc., Doe v. 2themart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D.
Wa. 2001) (No. C01-453Z). Furthermore, as one commentator noted, if online comments
are driving stock prices down, the company has the same opportunity as those writing the
negative comments to get online and attempt to inflate its demand with more positive
ones. DEMAC, supra note 22.

31. Matherson v. Marchello, 473 N.Y.S.2d 998, 1000 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 525 cmt. B (1977)).
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damages, which are granted only upon a showing that the defendant
wantonly injured the plaintiff. 32 Most likely, a corporate defendant

will not file a defamation suit hoping to receive monetary
compensation.33 Corporations, instead, file in hopes of either
identifying the unknown speaker,34 who is likely an employee of the
corporation she is defaming, or eliminating the existence of these
online remarks.35 In Raytheon Co. v. John Does 1-21,36 for example,

Raytheon voluntarily dismissed its suit immediately upon learning the
identity of its defendants, who were Raytheon employees.37

This

dismissal may not be a break for the defendants, however, since they
may now face losing their job or incurring other reprimands from
their employer.
Other than the damage awards that an individual plaintiff may
recover, Internet defamation suits potentially have farther-reaching
consequences. Like so many other First Amendment issues, online
defamation suits could have devastating effects on our freedom of
speech. The theory is that defamation suits discourage speakers from
talking, even behind the cloak of a pseudonym, for fear of the
32. For a discussion of these damages, see Michael Hadley, Note, The Gertz Doctrine
and Internet Defamation, 84 VA. L. REV. 477, 480-81 (1998).
33. Typically, the defendants in these suits would be incapable of fulfilling a large
monetary award; the incentive to litigate is thus very different for corporate clients. See
Lidsky, supra note 18, 867-77 (discussing the non-monetary incentives that companies
have in pursuing defamation litigation against anonymous defendants). Most companies
treat potential litigation like any other business decision, analyzing the costs and the
benefits. See id. at 876-83 (examining the possible reasons that a corporation may sue a
"John Doe" for defamation, and arguing that, although corporations may never see a dime
from the defendants, corporations may nonetheless "deem it economically rational to sue
the pseudonymous posters who make negative statements about them"). On the other
hand, the company may use a large damage request as another way to intimidate its critics
into silence. DEMAC, supra note 22.
34. Furman, supra note 27, at 214 (noting that lawsuits are filed for the "primary
purpose of uncovering an individual's identity"); Raney, supra note 25 (citing one
anonymous defendant's lawyer who believes these lawsuits are a frivolous attempt to
ascertain identities). For instance, the corporation may be looking to punish its own
employees for violating privacy or other employment agreements. See Immunomedics,
Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773, 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001) (holding that the
corporation's right to subpoena the identity of an online speaker outweighed the speaker's
right to anonymity where the evidence tended to prove that the speaker was an employee
of the corporation in violation of certain company confidentiality agreements); Cook,
supra note 28, at 30 (stating that proving an employee is violating policy would be easier to
prove than libel).
35. Furman, supra note 27, at 218 (stating the purpose of filing the action is not to
prove defamation but to silence the speech); Lidsky, supra note at 18, 881-82 (arguing that
silencing John Doe is one of the largest motivations behind these corporate Internet
defamation suits).
36. Civil Action No. 99-816 (Mass. Super. Ct., filed February 1, 1999).
37. Sobel, supra note 25, at $ 15.
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consequences of such a suit.38 Even if these new suits do not result in
an award of damages, the "chill" can be felt when an online user is
identified. 39 The Supreme Court has long recognized the importance
of communicating anonymously as a part of the freedom of speech,
stating that "anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of the majority."4
Lower courts, following the Supreme Court's lead, thus apply strict
scrutiny for any request to unmask anonymous defendants because of
the potential for chilled speech.41 The Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit, for instance, requires that a plaintiff demonstrate a
compelling interest if the court foresees that a subpoena identifying
an unknown speaker may chill the exercise of free speech. 42
On the other hand, Professor Lyrissa Lidsky has argued that
defamation suits may have a positive effect on Internet discourse as
well.43 Lidsky explains that these suits may help to "civilize
cyberspace" in two ways. First, lawsuits will reduce the likelihood of
defamation occurring in the first place.'
Without fear of being
attacked online, it is more likely that we will hear from all view
points. 5 Second, allowing more defamation suits to proceed may
help drive meaningless or abusive speech from message boards and
chat rooms. 46 But not everyone agrees with Lidsky's theory, and the
courts remain hesitant to remove the anonymity that the Internet
provides for fear of generating a chill effect.47
3. Identifying the Proper Online Defendant
Finally, Internet defamation suits are unique because they
become exceptionally complicated when trying to determine who the
appropriate defendant should be. For instance, when an Internet user
38. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 888-89; see also infra notes 150-51 (discussing one award
of three quarters of a million dollars to a company based on defamatory online remarks).
39. See Lee Tien, Who's Afraid of Anonymous Speech? McIntyre and the Internet, 75
OR. L. REV. 117, 144 (1996) (arguing that forced revelation of a speaker's identity has
serious and devastating effects on free speech discourse); Raney, supra note 25 (discussing
the intent of company's filing suit against John Doe is only to seek his identity and chill
such speech in the future).
40. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 357 (1995) (invalidating an
Ohio law that sought to prohibit anonymous pamphleting for political campaigns).
41. See Am. Constitutional Law Found. v. Meyer, 120 F.3d 1092, 1101-03 (10th Cir.
1997); Doe v. 2themart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1093 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
42. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena, 819 F.2d 1137 (Table) (4th Cir. 1987) (affirming
the district court).
43. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 886-87.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. See supra notes 38-41.

2003]

ANONYMOUS INTERNET USERS

1197

posts a statement to a chatroom, he may do so under a pseudonym;
thus, the only information that a reader has about its author is the
Internet site name and pseudonym. 48 Although it seems that
49
traditional defamation law should hold Internet Service Providers
("ISPs") liable for publishing defamatory material on their sites,"°
Congress has created a large safe haven for online publishers. 1
Originally, ISPs that exercised some editorial control over their
postings could be held liable for defamatory statements that they
published.5" That rule changed, however, upon Congress's passage of
the Communication Decency Act ("CDA").53 A general trend
among federal courts construing the CDA is for federal courts to
refuse to hold ISPs liable for the postings on their sites, even when
the ISPs consciously republish the material. 4 Thus, a defamed person
or corporation's only option is to pursue legal action against the
writer of such material. But just who is this John Doe, and how does
one sue him?
48. The ISP, however, may have more information about the user's identity. Most
simply, an ISP is a company that provides access to the Internet to its customers. Jennifer
Dolman, When Can ISP's be Compelled to Identify Their Customers?, THE LAWYERS
WEEKLY, Vol. 22, No. 13 (Aug. 9, 2002), available at LEXIS, Nexis Library, The Lawyers
Weekly News. When the user connects to the Internet through the ISP, the ISP assigns
the user an Internet protocol, a numeric "address," which can be used to identify the
anonymous online speaker. Id. Thus, an ISP has the means to trace a pseudonym back to
a specific computer.
49. The Communications Decency Act defines "Internet Content Providers" as "any
person or entity that is responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of
information provided through the Internet or any other interactive computer service." 47
U.S.C. § 230(f)(3).
50. See infra notes 201-02 and accompanying text.
51. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c) (2000) (mandating that no ISP should be treated as the author
of any material provided by a user of its services).
52. Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Servs. Co., 23 Media L. Rep. 1794, 1799 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1995) (holding the Prodigy server liable for comments made by an online forum
member libeling the Stratton Oakmont company because of the editorial control Prodigy
maintained in deciding what material would be published online, thereby increasing its
liability in defamation suits).
53. Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104 § 502(e), 110 Stat. 56,
133 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 47 U.S.C.).
54. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1137 (E.D. Va.), affd, 129 F.3d 327,
335 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that, under the CDA, an ISP is immune from liability for not
removing defamatory material); Marczeski v. Law, 122 F. Supp. 2d 315, 327 (D. Conn.
2000) (holding the CDA shields this defendant from liability for the alleged defamation).
Thus, AOL would not be liable for publishing defamatory content, but if a newspaper such
as The Washington Post published such material, it might be liable. JEREMY HARRIS
LIPSCHULTZ, FRESS EXPRESSION IN THE AGE OF THE INTERNET 150 (2000) (citing
Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp 44, 52-53 (D.D.C. 1998)).
55. Lidsky, supra note 18, at 872. It appears that the "Good Samaritan" sections of
the CDA were intended to protect ISPs from liability only if they had, in good faith,
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II. ONLINE DEFAMATION AND THE PROBLEMS OF SUING JOHN DOE

One major problem facing corporations as they try to hold
someone legally accountable for defamatory online publication is that
the author is anonymous. Most chat room users communicate under
a pseudonym,56 masking their true identity from others on the
Internet." The problem of suing an unknown defendant arose long
before the Internet became popular, yet despite the increase in
unknown parties, many of the difficulties with these suits continue.58
In several contexts, unknown defendants have been parties to
legal action. For example, in property or estate settlement disputes, it
is necessary to have all interested parties involved, but sometimes

these parties are unknown.59 In response, some states have drafted
statutes permitting civil actions against unknown persons. 6' Other
statutes address the issue of corporations operating under fictitious
names, 61 allowing plaintiffs to sue the unknown owners or operators
of such corporations.6 2

attempted to censor offensive material from their sites. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
Nevertheless, noticeably, the courts have created a much larger shield of liability.
56. George F. du Pont, Comment, The Criminalization of True Anonymity in
Cyberspace, 7 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 191, 197-98 (2001). A pseudonym is
a group of letters, symbols, and numbers that represent the online user.
57. There is, however, a distinction between true anonymity, which has a completely
untraceable identity, and pseudo-anonymity, which can be traced through a series of
difficult steps to discover the identity behind the pseudonym. Id. For purposes of this
Comment, I consider both anonymous and pseudo-anonymous messages to be from
unknown persons because the identity of the writer is unknown to the readers.
58. See, e.g., Carol Rice, Meet John Doe: It is Time for Federal Civil Procedure to
Recognize John Doe Parties,57 U. PITr. L. REV. 883, 884 n.2 & 913-46 (1996) (discussing
the inadequate rules of civil procedure for unknown parties in a lawsuit).
59. Chandler v. Ward, 58 N.E. 919, 924 (Ill. 1900) (defining necessary parties as those
connected with the subject matter in question).
60. The statute in Chandler, for instance, provided that a suit involving an unknown
party may proceed so long as the complaint acknowledges unknown parties, steps have
been taken to find said parties, and notice has been given to these parties by publication.
Id. at 925. If these steps are fulfilled, any court order will be binding upon the unknown
defendants as if the suit were against their proper names. Id.
61. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 474 (West 1979) (indicating that a plaintiff may
properly sue a corporation operating under a fictitious name so long as the plaintiff recites
this in the pleadings and amends the complaint when the true name becomes known); see
also Curtis v. Albion-Brown's Post, 219 N.E.2d 386, 388 (Ill. App. 1966) (citing an Illinois
statute that requires all people conducting business under an assumed name to file, with
the county clerk, a certificate identifying the owner, and allowing for suit against such
owners).
62. Curtis, 219 N.E.2d at 389 ("Obviously the General Assembly intended that a cause
of action arising out of the conduct or transaction of business be not defeated because of
the claimant's inability to identify the individuals who in fact own and conduct the
business.").
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The Supreme Court first recognized a plaintiff's right to sue
unknown defendants in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the
Federal Bureau of Narcotics.63 Webster Bivens sought relief for
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights during his arrest by federal

authorities.64 Despite the fact that Bivens was unable to identify a
single officer that had participated in his arrest, the district court

ordered that his complaint be served on all "agents who it is indicated
by the records of the United States Attorney participated in the

arrest."65 The Supreme Court upheld this order recognizing Bivens's
right to seek relief on his infringed civil liberties from unknown
defendants.66
Though some courts permit cases against John Doe defendants,
it is often only under certain conditions. For instance, courts often
require the plaintiff to describe the unknown defendant sufficiently to

ensure that they are a legally accountable person or entity.67 Next,
the plaintiff may have to prove that the identity of the defendant is, in
fact, unascertainable through the exercise of due diligence. 68 The
standard of due diligence requires a good faith, honest effort on the

part of the plaintiff to use reasonable effort (not all conceivable
means) to discover the identity of the defendant.69 Moreover, the
plaintiff may have to prove that he is, in good faith, pursuing claims
against the unknown parties in a timely manner,7 ° and that he is not
stalling to create new theories of liability. Finally, the plaintiff must
attest, by affidavit, that he has met all of these requirements.7'

63. 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 390 n.2.
66. Id. at 395-98.
67. See People v. Seda, 712 N.E.2d 682, 684 (N.Y. 1999) (holding the statute of
limitations was tolled in a case where the state did not know the identity of the defendant,
and referred to him merely as the "Zodiak killer").
68. Reed v. Gregory, 46 Miss. 740, 741-42 (1872) (explaining that, while the recently
enacted state statute authorized notice by publication as a sufficient means of notice for
unknown heirs in a chancery suit to divide the estate, such publication is only sufficient if
the plaintiff first diligently attempts to ascertain the identity of the unknown, interested
parties).
69. Berry v. Howard, 146 N.W. 577, 580 (S.D. 1914) (defining the standard of a dye
diligence search for unknown heirs).
70. Martin v. McCabe, 213 S.W.2d 497, 503 (Mo. 1948) (holding that if the defendant
was unnamed merely due to a lack of reasonable inquiry by the defendant, judgment
against the defendant is vitiated); Berry, 146 N.W. at 580 (holding that plaintiff did not
exercise due diligence in discovering the identity of the unknown heirs and, therefore,
notice to them by publication did not serve as reasonable notice).
71. Berry, 146 N.W. at 580.
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Unknown defendant cases, however, raise several procedural
problems and, as a result, some courts have refused to hear such
cases.7 2 These problems include the courts' jurisdiction over the
defendant and the plaintiffs' amending the complaint to include the
name of the defendant when it becomes known.
A.

Jurisdictionover John Doe

1. Jurisdiction Generally
Before a court's order will be binding on a defendant, the court
must ensure that it has both personal and subject matter jurisdiction.73
First, the plaintiff must show that the court has personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. Only in certain circumstances may a state court
exercise personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant.74 Since
the plaintiff does not know the true identity or whereabouts of the
defendant, it becomes technically impossible to meet this pleading
requirement.7 5

The plaintiff must further demonstrate that the court has subject
matter jurisdiction over the defendant. Subject matter jurisdiction
will not present a problem if the company files in state court,
however, as every state has a court of general subject matter
jurisdiction.76

But, lacking knowledge of an unknown defendant's

residence could adversely affect the company's ability to file in

72. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
73. This is a two-part inquiry. First, the court must be authorized by statute to assert
jurisdiction over the person, and second, the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the
person must be constitutional under the Due Process Clause of the Constitution. See
generally Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (discussing the personal jurisdiction
requirement). The second part of this analysis is satisfied if the defendant has minimum
contacts within the state trying to assert jurisdiction. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 316 (1945). Moreover, the court may have general, personal jurisdiction, where
it can hear any claim against the defendant, or specific jurisdiction, where it can only hear
claims relating to the defendant's actions in the state.
74. These circumstances are discussed in the state's long arm statute. See, e.g., N.Y.
C.P.L.R. § 302 (McKinney 2001) (stating that a New York court can exercise jurisdiction
over anyone who transacts business in the state, or commits a tort outside the state that
harms anyone inside the state if he is engaged in regular business in the state or reasonably
expects the consequences arising from this act to affect anyone in the state).
75. Rice, supra note 58, at 920 (noting that without knowing the identity of the person
he is suing, a plaintiff cannot in good faith allege to know his citizenship).
76.. See generally Morrell v. McCardle, No. C 98-0174 VRW (PR), 1998 U.S. .Dist.
LEXIS 1855, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 1998) (stating that "[u]nlike state courts, they
[federal courts] have no 'inherent' or 'general' subject matter jurisdiction").
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To determine whether subject matter jurisdiction

exists, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require the plaintiff to set
forth a "short and plain statement of the grounds upon which the
court's jurisdiction depends."78 If the plaintiff is entering federal
court on diversity grounds, the plaintiff must prove that he and the

defendant are citizens of different states.79 When the defendant's
whereabouts are unknown, a federal court cannot know whether it
has diversity jurisdiction.
The courts' reactions to Doe defendants have been varied and

unpredictable. One judge in the Northern District of Illinois, for
instance, has refused to hear cases on diversity jurisdiction grounds
when the defendant's identity is unknown.80 While most other courts
have not been so adamant in their refusal,8" some have raised the bar
for the plaintiff, requiring the plaintiff to attempt to prove Doe's
citizenship before proceeding.82 In 1987 the Ninth Circuit boldly
refused to grant removal from state courts for any cases with a Doe
defendant. 3 Congress acted quickly, however, passing a statute

declaring that the citizenship of Doe defendants should be ignored for
removal purposes.'
Yet not all courts have concluded that this
77. See supra note 73 (discussing personal jurisdiction). These restrictions on
jurisdictions, however, only limit a plaintiff's ability to file in federal court, with no effect
on the state court option.
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1).
79. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2000).
80. See Salzstein v. Bekins Van Lines, Inc., 747 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (N.D. I11.
1990)
(noting the court's disfavor of diversity jurisdiction in Doe defendant cases).
81. A district court in Hawaii, for instance, indicated that the plaintiff was assuming
the risk by filing a diversity case in federal court when the citizenship of the defendant was
unknown, and that court would dismiss the case if it later found that jurisdiction was
improper. Macheras v. Center Art Galleries-Hawaii, Inc., 776 F. Supp. 1436, 1440 (D.
Haw. 1991) ("A plaintiff who names Doe defendants, files suit in federal court at his
peril."); see also Weber v. Kosack, 96 Civ. 9581 (LMM), 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16786 at
*7-9 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1.997) (discussing the struggle that federal courts face in
determining whether unknown parties meet the requirement of diversity jurisdiction and
denying defendant's motion to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction).
82. See Dunn v. Paducah Int'l Raceway, 599 F. Supp 612, 613 n.1 (W.D. Ky. 1984)
(determining that a Doe defendant does not destroy good faith allegations of diversity of
citizenship).
83. Bryant v. Ford Motor Co., 844 F.2d 602, 605 (9th Cir. 1987) (citing frustration with
the lack of consistency in the federal circuits, the court, sitting en banc, created an outright
ban on state claims with Doe defendants).
84. Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(a),
102 Stat. 4642, 4669 (1988) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1441(n) (2000)). Commentary to the
rule suggests that if the identity of the defendant is later found to destroy diversity, the
court should act (under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(e) (2000)) to either deny joinder or permit
joinder and remand the case back to the appropriate state court. H.R. REP. No. 100-889,
at 71 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6031, 6031-32.
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statute applies to the original complaint,8" and there remains no
clarity on diversity jurisdiction over Doe defendants.86
2. Jurisdiction and the Internet
Suits arising over Internet activity add a new dimension to the
jurisdiction question.
To determine whether a state may
constitutionally assert jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant
must meet the "minimum contacts" test,87 meaning that he must
"purposefully avail" himself of contacts within the forum state.88 A
plaintiff could argue, then, that any defendant who commits a crime
or tort on the Internet meets this standard in every state in the
country because Web sites are accessible everywhere there is an
Internet connection. There is no easy way to allow residents of only
one state to access a Web site.89 Courts, therefore, have not found
that such a broad reading of the minimum contacts requirement is
appropriate for all actions involving the Internet.9"
The judicial trend is a "sliding scale" for the evaluation of the
defendant's contacts. This approach requires the court to analyze the
scope and breadth of the Internet contacts. Under this approach, the
court considers both the quality and quantity of the entity's online
activity to determine if it may constitutionally exercise personal
jurisdiction.9 The more significant and commercial the activity, the
more likely that jurisdiction is proper. Thus, a defendant who
knowingly enters into repeated online contracts with residents of a
state can expect that the state may properly assert jurisdiction over

85. See Salzstein, 747 F. Supp. at 1283.
86. Rice supra note 58, at 925 (stating that "the question of a Doe defendant's impact
on diversity jurisdiction may be even more confused today").
87. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877)).
88. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958) (holding that to meet minimum
contacts, the defendant must do some act to purposefully avail himself of the privilege of
conducting business in the state).
89. For instance, a company could limit access to its Web site to residents of a single
state by mailing each resident of the particular states a user-name and password to access
the site, but, doing so would add substantial costs, making this suggestion unrealistic.
90. In Weber v. Jolly Hotels, 977 F. Supp. 327 (D.N.J. 1997), for instance, a New
Jersey district court stated that the mere presence on the Internet will not satisfy the
minimum contacts requirement needed for the court to exercise personal jurisdiction over
the non-resident defendant. Id. at 333. But see Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937
F. Supp. 161, 164-65 (D. Conn. 1996) (applying a broad view of Internet contacts and
holding the defendant liable when residents of the forum state did access the Web site).
91. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119,1124 (W.D. Pa. 1997).
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him.92 On the other hand, under this approach, the operator of a
"passive' 93 web site will not be subject to jurisdiction in every state.94
This approach will provide little help for plaintiffs wishing to sue
unknown defendants for defamatory comments posted on Internet
Web sites. Courts will likely place defendants that merely post
messages online, rather than operating a Web site or running an
online business, at the lowest end of the spectrum. By merely placing
a comment in a medium publicly available throughout the world, the
defendant's conduct would not satisfy the minimum contacts test and,
unless the defendant had another, stronger connection to the forum
state, asserting personal jurisdiction over the defendant in such a case
would not be constitutional.
B.

Statute of Limitations Bar and the Relation Back Doctrine

Claims of online defamation; like virtually every legal action, are
subject to statutes of limitations that, after a certain amount of time,
will bar the plaintiff from pursuing her claim.96 Most courts recognize
that the purpose of pleading against a John Doe defendant is to file
one's claim before the statute of limitations runs out even though the
true identity of the defendant is not yet known.97 As one court asked,
"Should a plaintiff lose his right to have his case tried because of
ignorance of the names of parties whom he has a right to sue, and as
to whom he may have a good cause of action?" 98 The Federal Rules
92. E.g., Compuserve, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257, 1263 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding a
defendant who marketed his product through a local service provider had purposefully
availed himself of doing business in that state and personal jurisdiction over him was
properly asserted).
93. A passive site is one that does no more than provide information; the site and the
viewer do not interact beyond the displaying of static information. See Zippo Mfg., 952 F.
Supp. at 1124.
94. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295, 299 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that
the defendant did not purposefully target residents of the forum state and, therefore,
jurisdiction was not proper based on his online activity).
95. Weber, 977 F. Supp.at 333 (holding that the defendant did not attempt to conduct
business by placing pictures of its hotel rooms over the Internet and that, as a "passive"
site, personal jurisdiction over the Italian company was not proper).
96. Faigan v. Doubleday Dell Publ'g Group, Inc., 98 F.3d 268, 271-72 (D. Wis. 1996)
(discussing how the state's borrowing statute-which states that, for a "foreign" claim
where the injury occurred outside of the home state, the proper statute of limitations will
be the shorter between the home and foreign state-will be difficult to implement for
Internet defamation cases).
97. E.g., Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 856 (9th Cir. 1969) ("The only purpose
the naming of fictitious defendants could possibly serve is to make it possible to substitute
named defendants after the statute of limitations has run.").
98. Larson v. Barnett, 225 P.2d 297, 302 (Cal. 1950) (quoting Irving v. Carpentier, 11
P. 391, 392 (Cal. 1886)) (discussing a provision in the state's civil procedural rules that
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of Civil Procedure seemed to have answered this question when it
created the "relation back doctrine;" upon closer consideration,
however, it appears that the new rules may generate more problems
for these plaintiffs than they solve.99
To correct mistakes in the original pleadings, the relation back
doctrine permits a plaintiff to amend its pleadings, in certain defined
circumstances, after the statute of limitations has run on a claim.' ° A
plaintiff seeking to amend another party's name in the complaint
after the statute of limitations has run. must meet the three-part test
contained in Rule 15(c)(3): (1) the claim in the amended pleading
arises from the same transaction as the original pleading; (2) the new
party had timely notice of the lawsuit; and (3) the new party "knew or
should have known that, but for a mistake concerning the identity of
the proper party, the action would have been brought against the
party. 1 °1
/
An illustration is most helpful to understand the problems
created by the relation back doctrine. Assume Company XYZ
notices a decline in its stock price over a year. Looking for answers,
company officials scour the Internet and find defamatory remarks
about the company on a certain Web site devoted to the company.
The XYZ officials believe these remarks are the reason for their
damaged stock value and they want to sue the writer for defamation.
The writer is operating under the pseudonym "Bad-Boy," and the
corporation has no way of ascertaining his real identity. The statute
of limitations on defamation is one year'02 so XYZ corporation files
suit against the unknown Bad-Boy to save its claim from being
barred.0 3 Subsequently, during the course of discovery, Bad-Boy's
identity is revealed and XYZ wants to amend its complaint to state
his name. In order to amend the complaint, XYZ must satisfy the
three-part standard of Rule 15(c)(3). Upon a literal reading of these

enables a plaintiff to file suit against a fictitious party when the defendant's true identity is
unknown).
99. Rice, supra note 58, at 927 (noting the irony in that the relation back doctrine,
which was created to deal with Doe defendants, now creates the largest problems for
them).
100. See Dore v. City of Fairbanks, 31 P.3d 788, 791 (Ala. 2001).
101. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(3)(B).
102. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-54(3) (2001). Again, defamation is a state law action, so the
statute of limitations may vary from state to state.
103. Other statute of limitations issues may arise here such as when the cause of action
actually accrued. These problems are beyond the scope of this Comment.
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requirements, however, XYZ, or any similarly-situated plaintiff,
would be unable to meet the test of Rule 15(c)(3). 1°
The first requirement of the relation back test-requiring that
the claim in the amended complaint arise from the original
complaint-should always be met when the plaintiff is seeking to
amend to substitute the name of a defendant.105 In this hypothetical,
the amended complaint would recite the same facts and cause of
action. The second relation back requirement should be satisfied if
the plaintiff moves to amend the complaint and serves the new
defendant within 120 days 0 6 of filing the original complaint. At least
one court has found that serving the identified defendants
unequivocally operates as adequate notice to the Doe defendants." 7
Even if discovery is not started immediately, a diligent XYZ should
be able to get this necessary information and move to amend its
complaint within the prescribed time frame.
The third requirement in Rule 15(c) discusses permission to
amend the complaint when the plaintiff was mistaken about the
identity of the defendant. In most Doe defendant cases, the plaintiff
is not mistaken about the identity of the party, the plaintiff
corporation just does not know it. The question, therefore, is whether
this amounts to a "mistake in identity" under the relation back
doctrine? The federal courts that have explored this issue have come
up with three different approaches to answering this question. 08
The first approach applies a literal meaning to mistake and
forbids amending the complaint under Rule 15(c)(3) if it is to add the
identity of a defendant who was originally unknown. 09 In Wood v.
Woracheck," ° the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit was the
first to implement this approach, holding that a lack of knowledge of

104. Rice, supranote 58, at 927-31.
105. Id. at 928 (noting that the amended pleading in these cases is generally a verbatim
recitation of the first complaint, differing only in the substituted name).

106. This number comes from a careful reading of the rule, requiring these steps to be
taken within the period expressed in Rule 4(m) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
FED. R. Civ. P. 4(m).
107. Cruz v. City of Wilmington, 814 F. Supp. 405, 410 (D. Del. 1993). Not giving the
newly-identified party notice within this time frame may, on the other hand, eliminate the
opportunity to amend the complaint. See, e.g., Craig v. United States, 413 F.2d 854, 85758 (6th Cir. 1969) (holding the motion to amend did not relate back due to untimely

notice).
108. See Steven S. Sparling, Note, Relation Back of "John Doe" Complaints in Federal
Court: What You Don't Know Can Hurt You, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1235, 1253-74 (1997).
109. Rice, supra note 58, at 930-32 (noting that such a literal reading of the rule does

not comport with its purpose, which is to increase flexibility in amending complaints).
110. 618 F.2d 1225 (7th Cir. 1980).
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a party's identity is not an error as necessitated under the rule, and,

therefore, it did not matter whether the substituted defendant should
have known of the suit. 1 ' Under the second approach, courts
interpret the relation back rule very broadly as it applies to Doe
defendants.

These courts have held that "mistake" should include

any circumstance of improperly naming the defendant, 112 thereby
including the situation in which the original defendant is unknown.
Under this second approach, a plaintiff should be allowed to amend a

complaint to add the previously unknown identity of the defendant.
Finally, the third approach ignores the word "mistake," focusing on a
factual determination of whether the amended defendant had

adequate notice. Although no appellate court has adopted this
approach as the test under Rule 15(c)(3), at least one legal
3
commentator claims that focusing on notice is the best approach."
Thus, amid the confusion surrounding the meaning of mistake
under the relation back doctrine, the plaintiff may be barred from
amending a complaint based on a lack of knowledge of the identity of

the defendant. This seems an inherently unfair hurdle and one that
needs to be clarified through either a Supreme Court decision or a

substantive change in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
III. THE INTERNET DEFAMATION CASES AGAINST JOHN DOE

Because there are so many problems with suing unknown
defendants, it is unclear what steps potential plaintiffs should take.
Usually, once the suit is filed, the first step for judicial interference
occurs when the corporation files a subpoena on the anonymous
defendant's ISP, requesting identifying information about the
speaker.' In California, for instance, the plaintiff will have to make
111. Id. at 1230 (holding the plaintiff could not properly amend his complaint once
several defendant police officers had been identified, stating that Rule 15 "does not permit
relation back where, as here, there is a lack of knowledge of the proper party").
112. Rice, supra note 58, at 930, 933-35 ("A mistake within the meaning of the rule
exists whenever a party who may be liable for the actionable conduct alleged in the
Complaint was omitted as a party defendant." (citing Williams v. Avis Transport of
Canada, 57 F.R.D. 53, 55 (D. Nev. 1972))).
113. Id. at 930, 937-39 (calling this the "best approach" because it captures the goal of
the relation back doctrine and is fair to all parties). Rice does note that one district court
has used this approach. See Campbell v. Berferon, 486 F. Supp. 1246, 1251 (M.D. La.
1980), affd, 654 F.2d 719 (5th Cir. 1981).
114. Many ISPs receive requests for user identities. See Jeffrey Terraciano, Can John
Doe Stay Anonymous?, WIRED.COM, Feb. 21, 2001, at http://www.wired.com/news/
privacy/0,1848,41714,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). America
Online reported handling nearly five hundred subpoena requests in the year 2000 alone.
See Jeffery Brenner, Chat Room Rants Protected, WIRED.COM, Feb. 27, 2001, at http://
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such a request ex parte because the state Code of Civil Procedure
requires a showing of good faith before discovery can take place in a
1 5 Usually,
suit in which the defendant has not been properly served."
the ISP will then notify the defendant that his personal information is

being sought,1 6 and the potential defendant will be responsible for
fighting the subpoena. Because many Internet defamation cases are
dropped upon identification of the anonymous speakers, " 7 this
Comment only examines the motions for subpoenas by the allegedly

defamed companies. There have been very few of these cases based
on motions to quash such subpoenas, and although no definite
standard has emerged with which to analyze these requests, it is clear
that the

burden

on the corporation

seeking

the identifying

information will be very high." 8
The

first

Seescandy.com,"l9

important

case,

Columbia

involved a suit for trademark

Insurance Co.

infringement. 120

v.

The

plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order but did not know the

www.wired.comlnews/politics/O,1283,42039,00.html (on file with the North Carolina Law
Review). Roger Rosen and Charles Rosenberg, two attorneys who practice in this area
regularly, advise their clients to serve very broad subpoenas on the ISP asking for all
information the ISP may have of the user's account-name, address, email address,
telephone numbers, as well as a log of the postings by the anonymous poster. Roger
Rosen & Charles Rosenberg, Suing Anonymous Defendants for Internet Defamation, THE
COMPUTER & INTERNET LAW., Feb. 2002, at 9. This could be a double-edged sword,
however, since at least one court considered a broad subpoena request an instance of bad
faith. Doe v. 2themart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096 (W.D. Wash. 2001).
115. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE. § 2025(b)(2) (West 1979).
116. How an ISP deals with a request for an identity may depend on its particular
privacy policy. Yahoo!'s policy, for instance, explains to users that their identifiable
information may be disclosed in response to subpoenas, court orders or legal process.
YAHOO! PRIVACY, INFORMATION SHARING AND DISCLOSURE, at http://privacy.yahoo.
com/privacy/us/sbc/details.html (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review). Similarly, Microsoft Network discloses user information to "conform to the
edicts of the law or comply with legal process served on Microsoft or the site." MSN,
MSN STATEMENT OF PRIVACY, at http://privacy.msn.com (last visited Oct. 28, 2002) (on
file with the North Carolina Law Review). Neither ISP promises notification before
complying with such a legal request, but it is the policy of each to do so. Terraciano, supra
note 114 (quoting Nicole Berner, an attorney with Jenner and Block, familiar with
Yahoo!'s policies).
117. Raney, supra note 25 (discussing the Raytheon case that was dropped upon
revelation of the identities of twenty-one online critics); Terraciano, supra note 114
(noting another company that dropped its suit once the defamatory messages stopped
appearing on the website).
118. E.g., 2themart.com, 140 F. Supp. 2d at 1097 (arguing that courts should impose a
high threshold on corporations seeking information identifying online users).
119. 185 F.R.D. 573 (N.D. Cal. 1999).
120. Id. at 575.
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true identity or location of all of the defendants.1 21 The court
explained that because of problems with lack of proper service and
jurisdiction, John Doe cases are typically discouraged; however, the
Internet has created new opportunities for tortious activity by
anonymous or pseudonymous actors, and the plaintiffs in these cases
should not be left without relief. 122 Thus, the court created a fourfactor test to determine when a plaintiff, acting in good faith, has a
legitimate claim that deserves court intervention. 23
First, the plaintiff must identify the unknown defendant with
enough specificity to prove to the court that the defendant is a person
that can be sued in federal court.1 24 Second, the plaintiff must make a
good faith attempt to comply with service requirements and locate
the unknown party.
In Columbia Insurance Co., the plaintiffs
attempted to satisfy this requirement by delivering service papers to
all known email addresses of the defendant.1 26 The court held that
while this was not proper service, it did represent a good faith effort
to comply with these rules. 27 Next, the plaintiff must prove that the
action would survive a motion to dismiss. The purpose of this
requirement is to ensure that the plaintiff has filed a legitimate suit
and is not filing the case to intimidate or harass the potential
defendants." 8 Finally, the plaintiff must file a discovery request with
a list of the information sought, indicating how the plaintiff will use
this information to cure the existing defects with service of the
underlying suit. 129 The court thus gave the plaintiff fourteen days to
comply with this fourth requirement. 3 °
Other courts that have dealt with the issue of corporations
seeking the identity of unknown online defamers have created similar
tests. The only appellate court that has addressed this issue is the
Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey. 3 ' In two
121. Id. at 578-79. The plaintiff named some of the defendants by their online
pseudonyms, some by their site post names, and others by the registered identity.
122. Id. at 578.
123. Id. at 577-78.
124. Id. at 578. A court always has jurisdiction to determine whether or not it has
personal jurisdiction over a suit. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d
406, 430 (9th Cir. 1977).
125. Columbia Ins. Co., 185 F.R.D. at 579.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 579-80.
129. Id. at 580.
130. Id.
131. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001); Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773, 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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cases decided on the same day, the court created a very high, but not
insurmountable
standard for the plaintiff to succeed with a subpoena
32
on the ISP)
In the first case, Dendrite International,Inc. v. John Doe, 3 3 the
plaintiff was a corporation claiming that the defendants (John Does
numbered 1-14) had defamed the corporation on the ISP's bulletin
board. As a result, the corporation sought discovery of identifying
information from the ISP.134 By balancing the defendant's First
Amendment rights against the plaintiff's right to protect its
reputation, the court created a three-part test the plaintiff must satisfy
to compel an ISP to reveal the online users' identities. 35 First, the
plaintiff must prove that she has made a good faith attempt to notify
the defendants that they are the subjects of the subpoena, giving the
defendant reasonable time to respond to such a request. 36 Second,
the court should require the plaintiff to identify the specific
statements made by the defendants. 37 Third, the plaintiff must set
forth a prima facie case for a defamation action.'38 Although the
court cited Columbia Insurance Co. in creating the third prong, the
New Jersey court seemed to be imposing a much higher showing than
the Columbia Insurance Co. court required in the trademark
infringement case.'39

Here, the appellate court acknowledged that Dendrite had
proved the three basic elements of a defamation cause of action: (1)
identifying the defamatory statements; (2) identifying the utterer; and
(3) establishing that the statements were published.1 40 The court
agreed with the trial judge, however, that the plaintiff had failed to
prove harm from the defamatory statements, and thus had not met its

132. See infra notes 135-39 and accompanying text.
133. 775 A.2d 756 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. 2001).
134. Id. at 756-57.
135. Id. at 760-61.
136. Id. at 760.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. The court in Columbia Insurance Co. v. Seescandy.com required only that the
plaintiff bring a legitimate claim in good faith. 185 F.R.D. 573, 578 (N.D. Cal. 1999). In
Dendrite, however, the court demanded that the plaintiff prove that it had a prima facie
case. Dendrite,775 A.2d at 760.
140. Based on establishing these elements, Dendrite continued to plead that it had met
the prima facie requirement that the Seescandy.com court had created. Dendrite,775 A.2d
at 768-70 (citing Zoneraich v. Overlook Hosp., 514 A.2d 53, 63 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1986)).
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burden.14' The trial court analogized the subpoena request to a
motion by the government to seek discovery, and noted that a heavy
burden on the plaintiff was necessary to ensure that the discovery
process was not being abused. 4 2 Nonetheless, the appellate court
affirmed the denial of the subpoena request because Dendrite failed
to prove that it had been harmed by the defamatory statements.'43
This ruling raises the question of why the plaintiff would need to
prove harm in the earliest of discovery motions, before the defendant
had even been identified and when harm was not an element of its
claim.
In the other case decided by the New Jersey Superior Court
Appellate Division on the same day, the court denied a defendant's
motion to quash the subpoena served on an ISP to identify an
anonymous defendant. 44 In Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 45 the
plaintiff claimed the defendant was an employee of Immunomedics
that had breached a confidentiality agreement based on its online
comments. 146 The court found that the corporation's right to learn the
defendant's identity outweighed the user's right to remain anonymous
because Immunomedics clearly had established a prima facie cause of
action.' 47 Unlike Dendrite, the court did not require Immunomedics
to prove that the defendant's conduct had caused it harm, nor did the
court attempt to distinguish why the Dendrite case had required this
showing.
At about the same time the New Jersey appellate courts were
ruling, a Virginia trial court was reviewing a subpoena order from an
Indiana court on America Online ("AOL"), a Virginia corporation.
The Indiana court had ordered AOL to reveal the identities of five
anonymous online critics of an Indiana company that also sought to
remain anonymous, citing potential economic harm if it revealed its
identity before it knew the identity of the defendants.'48 The Virginia
trial court created yet another standard, holding that the subpoena
141. Id. at 770. The court said that it refused to "take the leap" that the posting of the
negative messages had some connection to a decline in stock price of Dendrite without
something more concrete to go on. Id. at 769-70.
142. Id. at 770-71.
143. Id. at 772.
144. Immunomedics, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 773 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 776.
147. Id. at 777-78.
148. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Am. Online, Inc., No. 40570, 2000 WL 1210372,
at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Jan. 31, 2000), rev'd on other grounds, Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous
Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377 (Va. 2001).
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should be enforced if the plaintiff first provides a good faith basis for
the belief that it is the victim of actionable conduct by the defendants
and second, that the information sought is crucial to advancing the
plaintiff's claim.' 49 The Supreme Court of Virginia later reversed this
decision, not based on the subpoena standard, however, but because
the Indiana court improperly ruled that the online speaker could
remain anonymous. 150
Again, the appellate court missed an
opportunity to clarify the standard on subpoena motions.
A federal district court in Washington recently addressed this
issue and created yet another, similar test for balancing the First
Amendment rights of the online users to remain anonymous versus
the right of a plaintiff to seek discovery for a claim or defense. In
John Doe v. 2themart.corn,151 the court quashed a subpoena of an ISP
because the plaintiff failed to prove that the subpoena was directly
and materially related to its lawsuit. 5 2 2themart.com was facing a
derivative lawsuit by its shareholders and was seeking the identity of
twenty-three online speakers who had posted defamatory comments
about the corporation, and sought to prove through the subpoenaed
evidence that its stock price was declining not due to its own actions
but due to the illegal activities of the unknown critics.'53 The court
missed the connection and said it was unclear what effect these
defendants would have on the underlying derivative suit. 15 4 The court
adopted the following four-factor test for evaluating a subpoena to
identify a non-party to the lawsuit. First, the subpoena must be in
good faith, and not for an improper purpose such as to harass or
intimidate.'55 Second, the information sought must relate to the
underlying claim. 6 Third, the information must be "directly and
materially relevant" to the underlying claim or defense. 57 Finally, the

149. Id. at *8.
150. Am. Online, Inc. v. Anonymous Publicly Traded Co., 542 S.E.2d 377, 385 (Va.
2001).
151. 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D. Wa. 2001).
152. Id. at 1097-98.
153. Id. at 1091-97.
154. Id. at 1097.
155. Id. at 1095. The court held that the huge scope of the original subpoena tends to
show a lack of good faith on the part of 2themart.com. Id. at 1096.
156. Id. at 1095-96. In analyzing this factor under the current facts, the court held that
if the information sought related only to one of numerous claims or defenses, then it was
not worth compromising the party's First Amendment right to anonymity. Id. at 1096.
Here, the information would prove one of 2themart.com's twenty-seven affirmative
defenses. Id.
157. Id. at 1095.
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information sought must be unavailable from another source.158
Based on the facts before it, the court concluded that many of these
factors weighed in favor of quashing the subpoena motion. 59 Though
this case was unique because the plaintiff sought the identity of nonparties to the suit and not the identity of the defendants, the case
illustrates yet another approach employed by a misguided court to

balance the First Amendment right of the anonymous online speaker
with the interests of the corporation in uncovering the identity of the
speaker who allegedly defamed the corporate reputation.
While at least one trial court has found sense enough amid this
confusion to follow a precedent, 161 the majority of recent cases
confirm that the lower courts lack a consistent rule to follow when
considering subpoenas for the identity of alleged online defamers.
For instance, one California federal district court recently dismissed a
corporation's defamation action against anonymous Internet
posters."' District Judge David Carter held that the Internet postings

were not defamatory, under California law, because they represented
statements of opinion rather than fact. 62 A year earlier, however,
another federal district court in California took a much different
approach to a corporate Internet defamation lawsuit. In Felch v.
Day,63 Varian Medical Systems was awarded a $775,000 jury verdict
against former employees based on nearly fourteen thousand
defamatory messages spanning one hundred different Internet Web
sites. 6" In addition, the judge ordered a permanent injunction against
158. Id. The court found that 2themart.com had not met this factor because some of
the information that they sought was archived by the ISP and was available to the public.
Id. at 1095-97.
159. Id.
160. Applying the four-factor Dendrite test, the New Jersey trial court ruled in favor of
quashing a subpoena requested by the Town Council to identify online, libelous critics.
The judge ruled that the Council failed to plead with sufficient specificity and also failed to
adequately notify the potential defendants, therefore, not meeting two of the factors
articulated by the New Jersey appellate court. Mary P. Gallagher, Defamation Plaintiffs
Cannot Learn Anonymous Online Critics' Identities, 167 N.J. L.J. 4, 4, 15 (2002).
161. Global Telemedia Int'l v. Doe, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1261, 1271 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
162. Id. This ruling has pleased several Internet privacy experts who have long been
arguing that online message board postings should be analyzed under the opinion
exception to defamation. Brenner, supra note 114; see also supra text accompanying notes
16-18 (discussing the opinion exception).
163. 238 F.3d 428 (Table), 2000 WL 1364444 (9th Cir. 2000) (vacating a preliminary
injunction issued by the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California). Upon remand, the jury awarded the plaintiff $775,000. Stephanie Armour,
Courts Frown on Online Bad-Mouthing, USA TODAY, Jan. 7, 2002, at lB.
164. Id. at 428; Armour, supra note 163. The allegedly defamatory messages included
complaints of discrimination by company personnel against gays and pregnant women.
See Armour, supra 163.
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the message writers. 165 The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,
similarly rejected defendants' First Amendment defense, but the
court did not issue an oral or written opinion, leaving the

166
constitutional questions unsettled.
The only thing that remains clear after analyzing these cases is
that there is no definite, uniform standard for a corporation seeking

the identity of an unknown defendant for defamation on the Internet.

All
parties
involved-plaintiffs,
defendants,
and
legal
commentators-agree that the increasing number of online
defamation cases combined with the fundamental right of free speech
amplify the need for tighter judicial scrutiny and a well-established
doctrine in this area. 67 Until such a doctrine exists, a plaintiff seeking
the identity of unknown, alleged defamers should be prepared for any
one of several standards that it may have to meet. From a minimal
showing that without the identifying information the plaintiff is
unable to properly serve the correct defendant, to an extensive
showing that his claim can survive a motion for summary judgment,
plaintiffs in these Internet defamation suits face a severe
16
disadvantage of not knowing their burden. 1
IV. A POTENTIAL SOLUTION: USE OF THE SIMILAR, SETTLED
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE JOURNALIST'S PRIVILEGE

ISPs are similar to reporters in many ways. First, both facilitate
the dissemination of information to the public, and both gather and
165. Order Granting Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary injunction, June 21, 1999, at
http://www.geocities.com/mobeta-inc/slapp/whyteorder.html
(on file with the North
Carolina Law Review).
166. Collins, supra note 3 (exploring a recent Third Circuit decision to not publish its
opinion on this subject).
167. Memorandum In Support of Motion of J. Doe to Quash Subpoena Issued to
Silicon Investor/Infospace, Inc., Doe v. 2themart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D.
Wa. 2001) (No. C01-453Z) (asking the court, in an amicus curiae brief filed by the
American Civil Liberties Union, to clarify the standard upon which disclosure of an
anonymous posters identity can be revealed); Terraciano, supra note 114 (discussing the
disappointment of the defendant in an online defamation case after settling because he
wanted to go to trial to set precedent that corporations cannot get private information just
for alleging that they were wronged). David Sobel, the general counsel for the Electronic
Privacy Information Center, has often been quoted as wanting the courts to set a legal
standard that would protect the First Amendment rights of online posters. See, e.g.,
Brenner, supra note 114 (discussing how an ISP deals with requests for identity); Raney,
supra note 25 (discussing the appeal of Internet anonymity).
168. Rosen & Rosenberg, supra note 114, at 9 (citing Bernson v. Browning-Ferris
Indus., Inc., 873 P.2d 613, 624 (Cal. 1994) (Kennard, J., dissenting)); see Columbia Ins. Co.
v. Seescandy.com, 185 F.R.D. 573, 577-81 (N.D. Cal. 1999); Dendrite Int'l., Inc. v. Doe,
775 A.2d 756, 767-72 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2001).
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distribute this information in the course of their normal activity, not
in preparation for lawsuits.'6 9 Second, both could suffer devastating
effects if they lose the trust of their information providers. As a
reporter argued in Branzburg v. Hayes,170 trust is an essential element
for reporters in maintaining informants;"' likewise, computer users
also seek privacy in their on-line dealings.7 2 Many commentators, in
fact, have argued that Internet speech would face a severe chill, as
users would be more reluctant to speak out on the Internet if they
worried that their identities could be revealed.'73 Fearing a lack of
anonymity, people may not want to speak to reporters or to post
comments on Internet message boards, thereby resulting in a loss of a
large pool of potential information.
Journalists have long used the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
to quash subpoena motions7 4 and have further asserted a journalist's
privilege to avoid divulging information to trial courts and grand
juries in both criminal and civil cases. The policy interests advanced
in these journalist cases are so similar to that of Internet defamation
suits that the test consistently applied by courts in journalist cases is
an adequate guide for analyzing the subpoenas on ISPs. Thus, this
comparison would give plaintiffs in Internet defamation suits an
established burden to meet when seeking identifying information
from ISPs. The following discusses the case law involving subpoenas
served on reporters to reveal an anonymous source.

169. Memorandum In Support of Motion of J. Doe to Quash Subpoena Issued to
Silicon Investor/Infospace, Inc., Doe v. 2themart.com, Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (W.D.
Wa. 2001) (No. C01-453Z).
170. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
171. Id. at 671 n.6.
172. At least one Internet user has fought back, suing an ISP that provided a company
with his identifying information. Writing under the name "Aquacool_2000," the user
made derogatory remarks about AnswerThink, a consulting company.
When
AnswerThink sued in federal court in California, Yahoo! quickly revealed
Aquacool_2000's identity. Aquacool_2000 then sued Yahoo!, alleging a breach of privacy,
but the two parties settled, so a court did not rule on the legitimacy of the claims. Dan
Bischof, Through Accusations of Defamation, Companies are Starting to Unmask
Anonymous Online Critics, NEWS MEDIA & THE LAW, Winter 2001, at 35, http://www.
rcfp.org/news/mag/v.cgi?25-1/lib-anonymou (on file with the North Carolina Law Review);
see also Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663, 671-72 (1991) (holding that the First
Amendment is not a defense for a claim of promissory estoppel where a reporter breached
a promise of confidentiality to an informant).
173. See supra notes 38-42 and accompanying text.
174. The rules provide that a court shall quash or otherwise modify a subpoena if it
requires disclosure of protected matter, and courts may do the same if the subpoena
requires disclosure of confidential research, in order to protect the person affected by the
subpoena. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(c)(3)(A)&(B).
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In the landmark decision of Branzburg v. Hayes,' the Supreme
Court rejected a reporter's assertion of journalistic privilege when he
was ordered to testify in front of a grand jury.'76 In that case, the
reporter had written a published piece on the marijuana trade and
had used anonymous sources in his story.'7 7 The piece implicated
unknown sources in criminal activity, and the Court held the reporter
did not have a constitutional right to conceal relevant facts of the case
when the grand jury investigated the crimes.'78 The Court recognized
the result may have some "chill" effect on news reporting, as some
informants may not wish to be interviewed for fear of later criminal
proceedings. This effect, however, was outweighed by the "public
interest in pursuing and prosecuting those crimes reported to the
'
press."179
Although the opinion of the Court rejected this assertion of
privilege, a majority of the justices recognized that reporters do have
a qualified First Amendment privilege. 8 °
Branzburgalso stands for the proposition that subpoenas seeking
a journalist's information need to be considered on a case-by-case
basis.' 8' Courts have thus assiduously analyzed journalists' privilege
claims, recognizing the important policies competing in these cases.
On one hand, the right to seek relief in a court of law is paramount in
a civilized society,'82 and prolific discovery is an essential part of our
judicial system, as shown in both substantive183 and procedural 1" rules
alike. On the other hand, our society values the free flow of ideas,
and imperative to that flow is the ability of news reporters to collect,
assemble, and distribute information to the public.'85 Thus, the
175. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
176. Id at 708-09. The journalistic privilege, a privilege created by state law, exempts
professional journalists from testifying in court based on information they received while
reporting on or gathering the news. E.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.5015(2) (West 1999)
(discussing the journalistic privilege).
177. Branzenburg, 408 U.S. at 667-68 (noting that the article stated that the reporter
had promised the subjects that their identities would not be revealed).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. This was observed by Judge Merhige in Gilbert v. Allied Chemical Corp., 411 F.
Supp. 505, 509 (E.D. Va. 1976).
181. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 709-10 (Powell, J., concurring).
182. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 549 (2d Cir. 1958).
183. "The law begins with the presumption that the public is entitled to every person's
evidence." Richards of Rockford, Inc., v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389 (N.D.
Cal. 1976) (citing Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932)).
184. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (permitting discovery of any relevant, non-privileged
material).
185. Pinkard v. Johnson, 118 F.R.D. 517, 520 (M.D. Ala. 1987) ("Any unwarranted
restraints upon the process of newsgathering and reporting could jeopardize the free flow
of information to the public.").
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question before courts is whether "the paramount interest served by
the unrestricted flow of public information protected by the First
Amendment outweighs the subordinate interest served by the liberal
discovery provisions . ..-

".

In weighing these principles, courts

identify a stronger interest in requiring disclosure for criminal
proceedings,' 87 but they have often held that even in civil cases, the
circumstances may necessitate a reporter reveal information,
including the identity of his sources.'88 Courts have thus strictly
89
scrutinized such identification requests on news reporters.
In civil cases, the test that has developed for analyzing a motion
to quash a subpoena of a reporter who claims this qualified
journalistic privilege requires the party seeking the subpoena to
1 (1) the information sought is relevant; (2) there is no
prove: 90
other
means for obtaining the information or all other means have been
exhausted; and (3) there is a compelling reason for disclosure. 19'
Applying a case-by-case analysis, a court also examines the type of
information sought in weighing the competing policies. 92 Thus,
overly broad subpoenas may not pass the test because all information
may not go to the core of the claim.'93 Moreover, information
divulged by an informant under a promise of confidentiality may
weigh in favor of non-disclosure.

94

In Garlandv. Torre,195 the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals, for example, applied these principles
holding that the reporter, who was also a named defendant, did not
186. Loadholtz v. Fields, 389 F. Supp. 1299, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 1975).
187. Baker v. F. & F. Investment, 470 F.2d 778, 785 (2d Cir. 1972); see Gilbert v. Allied
Chem. Corp., 411 F. Supp. 505, 510 (E.D. Va. 1976) (stating the balance weighs differently
for civil cases than it does for criminal, noting as one difference the ability of a civil litigant
to explore several avenues to obtain the information he seeks).
188. Carey v. Hume, 492 F.2d 631, 637-39 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (requiring a journalist to
reveal his source in a civil suit where the identity of the source went to the heart of the
plaintiff's claim).
189. J.J.C. v. Fridell, 165 F.R.D. 513, 515-17 (D. Minn. 1995); Solarex Corp. v. Arco
Solar, Inc., 121 F.R.D. 163, 167-75 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Loadholtz, 389 F. Supp. at 1300.
190. Initially, the burden is on the reporter to show that the information sought was
part of a newsgathering event. Von Bulow by Auersperg v. von Bulow, 811 F.2d 136, 14445 (2d Cir. 1987). Then the burden switches to the party compelling discovery. Pinkard,
118 F.R.D. at 521.
191. Pinkard, 118 F.R.D. at 521; see also Los Angeles Mem'l Coliseum Comm'n v.
Nat'l Football League, 89 F.R.D. 489,494 (C.D. Cal. 1981) (discussing an analogous test).
192. Pinkard, 118 F.R.D. at 521.
193. Mere relevance is not sufficient. Rancho Pub. v. Superior Ct., 68 Cal. App. 4th
1538, 1549 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999); see Gulliver's Periodicals, Ltd. v. Chas. Levy Circulating
Co., 455 F. Supp. 1197, 1204 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding the information sought could not be
divulged because it did not go to the heart of the counterclaim).
194. Riley v. City of Chester, 612 F.2d 708, 714 (3d Cir. 1979).
195. 259 F.2d 545 (2d Cir. 1958).
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have a First Amendment right to refuse to identify the source of the
defamatory statements he published where the identification went "to
the heart of the matter. 19 6 The court noted that privileged testimony
is an extraordinary exception to the evidentiary rules and courts
should err on the side of restricting the privilege rather than
increasing it.197 The subpoena in Garland was narrowly drafted,
seeking only the identity of the anonymous source, thus, the court
properly concluded that the balance tipped in favor of disclosure.' 98
Narrowly drafted subpoenas on ISPs that seek only relevant,
unprivileged information should likewise withstand attack in Internet
defamation suits.
Despite the analogy this Comment advocates, the law does not
ipso facto treat newspapers and the Internet equally. The Internet
and newspapers differ as mediums in that a newspaper can be held
liable for publishing defamatory remarks, 199 whereas an ISP cannot. 0 0
Although this Comment does not attack Congress's wisdom in
granting immunity to ISPs for the content that they provide, at least
one district judge has. Judge Friedman, of the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals, recognized that an ISP, such as AOL, is much more like a
newspaper than it is a common carrier like a telephone company.2 1
Judge Friedman explained that, "[b]ecause it has the right to exercise
editorial control over those with whom it contracts and whose words
it disseminates, it would only seem fair to hold AOL to the liability
standards applied to a publisher." 02 Moreover, because the news
media is subject to liability, the potential for inaccuracies is
decreased, while ISPs-which are immune from defamation
liability-are more likely to publish untruths.2 °3 Internet speech in
196. Id. at 547, 550 (asking the court to deny the identification request on the ground
that it "would, 'unreasonably annoy, embarrass, and oppress the deponent' "). But cf.
Richards of Rockford, Inc., v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 389 (N.D. Cal. 1976)
(refusing disclosure of interviewing materials where the subpoena was issued to a nonparty, there was no proof that defamatory statements were made during the interview, and
the interview was for educational research); Mitchell v. Superior Ct., 690 P.2d 625, 632
(Cal. 1984) (stating identity disclosure in libel cases is not automatic).
197. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 550 (2d Cir. 1958).
198. Id. at 547.
199. Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, Co., 497 U.S. 1, 14-21 (1990). But see Zeran v. Am.
Online, Inc., 958 F. Supp. 1124, 1132-37 (E.D. Va.), affd, 129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir.
1997).
200. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e) (2000).
201. Blumenthal v. Drudge, 992 F. Supp. 44, 51 (D.D.C. 1998).
202. Id.
203. See LIPSCHULTZ, supra note 54, at 153 (arguing that although the Internet may
increase the information available globally, this may not correspond to an increase in
value).
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general is, therefore, arguably of lesser value compared to that from
reporters in other news media. °4 If true, this may cut in favor of
courts revealing the identity of Internet posters even more readily
than they do in the journalism cases. But asking courts to distinguish
between the relative values of different forms of speech is walking a
fine line of constitutionality. 25 Overall, these differences do not
lessen the value of this analogy because these differences do not
affect the important policies that courts must weigh in deciding
whether to grant a subpoena to identify an unknown party. More
specifically, in both instances, courts are balancing the right of
anonymity and potential chill of speech against the entitlement for
the state or any plaintiff to gain access to evidence.
CONCLUSION

Both ISPs and reporters are frequently served with subpoena
motions asking them to reveal identifying information about alleged
defamers. 206 Although the Internet as a medium for publication is
unquestionably unique, subpoenas served on ISPs for identifying
information of its users implicate the same policies as similar requests
on reporters. Both analyses require a careful balancing of the right to
speak anonymously and the potential chill if this right is infringed
against the right for a plaintiff to have all relevant evidence when
proceeding with litigation. Thus, a consistent standard for Internet
defamation suits can be found in the test used in journalist cases.
The appropriate test is that a company, asking for identifying
information from an online user's ISP, must prove that the
information sought is relevant, goes to the heart of the company's
claim, and is unavailable from any other source. This test requires a
case-by-case determination that the plaintiff is, in good faith, bringing
the subpoena only after exhausting other means of gaining the
information itself. The plaintiff is not required to make a full, prima
204. See Lidsky, supra note 18, at 893 & n.195.
205. Larry Alexander, Legal Theory: Low Value Speech, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 550
(1989) (asking if we really want to ask our courts to distinguish values of speech under the
First Amendment and arguing that this would be quite problematic).
206. Subpoenas are issued to a variety of reporters, from those reporting for The
Washington Post to reporters of small, local newspapers-most often these reporters are
subpoenaed to identify criminals. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, Justice
Releases Statistics on Subpoenas of Reporters, (Dec. 6, 2001), at http://www.rcfp.org/news/
2001/1206grassl.html (on file with the North Carolina Law Review). Likewise, AOL and
other large ISPs say that responding to warrants and subpoena requests is like a full-time
job. Stephen Dinan, Search Warrants Keep AOL Busy, WASH. TIMES, April 27, 1999, at
C4, available at Lexis, Nexis Library, The Washington Times.

2003]

ANONYMOUS INTERNET USERS

1219

facie showing of defamation in this initial discovery request; 0 7 the
plaintiff, however, must prove that the subpoena is narrowly drafted
to ask only for information necessary to plead a legitimate claim of
defamation. If the plaintiff can meet this burden, the court should
order the subpoena on the ISP so the proper defendant can be
identified.
MEGAN M. SUNKEL

207. See Dendrite Int'l, Inc. v. Doe, 775 A.2d 756, 760-61 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2001); supra notes 133-43 and accompanying text (discussing the plaintiff's burden).

